Philosophy of education
This body of educational discourse is subject matter for the philosopher of education. His
concern with it will be twofold. He will be interested in the conceptual apparatus employed.
He will want to examine the major concepts used by practising teachers and theorists to
see what exactly is being said by this kind of language. What, he will ask, does ‘education’
involve? What exactly is teaching? What has to be the case before anyone can properly be
said to ‘know’ anything? What criteria have to be satisfied before what a teacher does can
truly be characterised as ‘punishing’? What is meant by saying that all children ought to be
given ‘equal opportunities’? What is meant by ‘freedom’ in an educational context? Questions
like these and the answers to them involve the philosopher in philosophical analysis
in trying to work out the criteria for the correct use of these terms. This activity of analysis
is important perhaps in its own right, but certainly so as a preliminary to the second of the
philosopher’s interests, the examination of educational theory. For educational discourse
is to a large extent a matter of educational theory and theories need to be scrutinised to see
whether they are well founded or not. The philosopher is concerned with the acceptability
of educational theory and a practical prerequisite of any enquiry into the credentials of a
theory is that the terms used in it should be made as clear as possible. Conceptual analysis is
thus the first step in the scrutiny. Then comes the examination of the theory itself, of its internal
coherence, its conformity with what is known about human nature, its conformity with
accepted moral convictions and its general practicability. Confronted with a general theory
of education the philosopher will ask: what is being recommended here? and: will it do?
This scrutiny may be carried out in more than one way. One way would be to take a historical
approach and deal with the more important theories of education in turn, beginning
with Plato and working through those of, say, Rousseau, Mill, Froebel and Spencer, and
ending with more or less modern theorists like Dewey. This would require an examination
of the various assumptions made in each case, assumptions about what was to count as an
educated man, about human nature, about the nature of knowledge and methods, testing
each assumption, and the argument as a whole, to see how far what was being said could be
rationally maintained. Another way, which will be followed in the remainder of this book,
is to look at educational theory in terms of major topics of interest which have emerged. In
the past, and still today, those who have been concerned with education have put forward a
number of views and have adopted a wide range of positions respecting educational practice.
These views have ranged from more or less conventional and unreflecting comments
on schooling to detailed accounts of the roles and functions of education in society. They
have attempted answers to questions like: what is education? What is the purpose of it?
What should be taught? Why should some subjects be taught and not others? How should
pupils be taught? How should they be disciplined and controlled? Who should be educated
and how should educational advantages be distributed? In other words they try to answer
questions about the curriculum, about worthwhile knowledge, about teaching methods,
about social considerations like the need for equality, freedom, authority and democracy
in education. These answers have been embodied in educational theories, either explicit
or implicit in practice. Questions like these and the answers to them have interested not
only the great historical theorists like Plato and Rousseau, but also many of those engaged
in everyday educational affairs.
